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Introduction 
The recent works by Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi, especially Precarious Rhapsody, suggest a profound 
mutation of human subjectivity under the pressure of the imposition of a range of technical 
automatisms of which the digital is the latest and the one which has the most profound effects. 
Berardi proposes that ‘video-electronic’ and ‘digital-connective’ generations have emerged 
whose affects and perceptions have been profoundly disturbed by the implantation of digital 
technologies in all spheres of life. What is less frequently remarked on in Berardi’s work is that 
the diagnosis of these mutations of subjectivity are frequently carried out in relation to the artistic 
cartographies generated by both film and media art, with a tendency to favour the former. For 
example, there are frequent references in Berardi’s work to Bergman’s The Serpent’s Egg (1977) 
and Gus van Sant’s Elephant (2003), to give only two examples. 
In this essay I aim to look more closely at these and other examples and how they function 
as cartographies mapping at once the transformations of labour and subjectivity under post-
fordist conditions. I then aim to extend this through an engagement with the recent film, The 
Social Network (2010), which can be read as a direct mapping of contemporary affective 
mutation in the context of 21st Century cognitive capitalism. I will argue that there are elements 
of these cinematic cartographies that call into question some aspects of Berardi’s diagnosis of 
contemporary subjective mutations, particularly the idea that they are necessarily associated with 
logics of technical acceleration and the destruction of affective relations with others. This 
diagnosis seems both predicated on ideas of cyberspatial disembodiment and to contain a latent 
humanism (the idea that a catastrophe will result from children learning language form a machine 
rather than from their mother epitomises this humanist dimension), that are complicated by the 
contemporary socialisation of digital culture in the so-called Web 2.0 era. This is not to say that 
the relations between humans and machines are not prone to the multiple pathologies diagnosed 
by Berardi but rather that these relations have taken on new forms and therefore will have 
different effects on subjectivity, than those attributed by Berardi to acceleration and 
disembodiment. It might be more fruitful in this context to follow other lines in Berardi’s work 
such as the ideas of the intensive implantation of technical automatisms, following market logics 
directly within quotidian subjectivation processes. I will argue that these films suggest these other 
tendencies of contemporary subjective mutation, potentials that may lead not only to new 
pathologies but also to new social antagonisms, subjectivities and modes of expression. 
 
Cinema as Symptom Versus Deleuzian Symptomatology 
It is truism of film theory, especially of a psychoanalytic or structuralist variety, that cinema 
functions as a cultural symptom. This goes back to Freud’s initial readings of works of art as the 
symptoms or sublimations of their creators’ pathologies. While Freud’s approach to aesthetics is 
generally admitted to be naive and reductive, his initial treatment of the work of art as symptom 
remains in psychoanalytic approaches to cinema, even if they follow in the wake of Lacan’s more 
complex and structuralist-inflected theories of the unconscious. Christan Metz, for example, 
treats the cinema as an ‘imaginary signifier’ (Metz 1977), which the theorist must take a distance 
from, and this was later elaborated by more politically engaged theorists who saw the cinema as a 
gigantic machine for the production of capitalist subjectivity. Similarly in Luara Mulvey’s  
‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’ (Mulvey 1989), the cinema is an apparatus that, in an 
Althusserian sense, interpellates subjects according to the binary of sexual difference and which 
is directly tied to the reinforcement of patriarchal values and power relations. In both these cases 
cinema in general and individual films are treated as the sick patient to be cured by the superior 
knowledge or discursive strategies of the analyst who refuses to be seduced by cinema’s wily 
pleasures. This approach, not only to cinema but to aesthetic texts in general, extends well 
beyond psychoanalytic approaches and constitutes a generalised ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ in 
relation to cultural objects that is merely intensified in relation to the mass semiotic machinery of 
the cinema, whose mass appeal to popular audiences rendered it that much more suspect in the 
eyes of many critical theorists. 
It is against this kind of approach that Deleuze developed the idea of the work of art as a 
symptomatology rather than symptom, by means of which the artist diagnoses both him or herself 
and the world. First developed in Deleuze’s presentation of Sacher Masoch’s Venus in Furs 
(Deleuze 1989b), this idea can be seen as the first principle of the collection of essays entitled 
Critical and Clinical Essays (Deleuze 1997). In both these instances what is challenged is the 
medicalisation of art and the artist in favour of an affirmation of what Felix Guattari would call 
aesthetic cartographies. In the case of Sacher-Masoch and de Sade, these authors were taken at 
face value by Krafft-Ebing and subsequent psychologists and their works seen as transparent 
windows onto the world of sadomasochism. Deleuze’s critique of this medicalised reading 
practice is twofold: firstly, any full attention to the texts of the two authors will reveal that their 
works present entirely different universes rendering it illegitimate to conflate them into a single 
sadomasochistic syndrome (Deleuze 1989b, 13). More importantly, what this reading strategy 
demonstrates is the medical treatment of works of literature as symptoms that are then projected 
onto their authors who are seen as prime sufferers of the syndrome they present in their works. 
Instead, Deleuze argues that they should rather be seen as clinicians who identify and diagnose 
signs, that is to say symptoms, ‘the physician of themsleves and of the world’ (Deleuze 1997, 3) . 
This not only reiterates the well-known defense of de Sade from charges of sadism by Bataille 
and others since, as Deleuze points out, a true sadist would rather conceal the dynamics of sadism 
by using ‘the hypocritical language of established order and power’ (Deleuze 1989b 17), but also 
argues against the reduction of Sacher-Masoch’s work to a mere clinical curiosity. Turning the 
medical gaze against itself, Deleuze claims that these authors present to us an exalted ‘pornology’ 
(18), a form of knowledge that doctors and psychoanalysts should learn from, instead of reducing 
these works and their authors to mere symptoms. A truly ‘critical and clinical’ approach to 
aesthetic works would then treat them less as pathological symptoms than as the critical diagnosis 
of forms of subjectivity or subjectivation processes. This does not mean that these authors do not 
have any experience of the pathologies that populate their works but rather that by going to the 
end of confronting and mapping these symptoms, they express what Deleuze calls the ‘great 
health’ of the artist (or philosopher since he includes Nietzsche and Spinoza in this), who returns 
from his visions with ‘bloodshot eyes and pierced ear-drums’ (Deleuze 1997, 3), like Kafka’s 
‘swimming champion who does not know how to swim’ (2). The importance for this article of 
this reversal of perspective in the critical and clinical analysis of aesthetic objects is that it 
informed not only Deleuze’s project but also the work of Félix Guattari and later that of Berardi. 
While Deleuze’s apparent auteurism can be seen as a type of shorthand for identifying particular 
arrangements of cinematic signs, it was in the work of Felix Guattari, who had a much greater 
practical and theoretical predisposition towards groups, that the possibilities of cinema as a 




Cinema as a Guattarian Aesthetic Cartography 
As Gary Genosko has indicated (Genosko 2009, 134), Guattari devoted frustratingly few pieces 
of writing to the cinema or individual films, yet what he did write is exemplary in its use of a 
symptomatological approach, relatively free of Deleuze’s vestigial auteurism. This is particuarly 
apparent in the short essay, ‘The Poor Man's Couch’ (Guattari 1996, 155-166), in which Guattari 
claims that cinema provides a type of mass equivalent of the psychoanalytic cure. For this reason 
psychoanalysts are singularly unable to grasp cinematic symptomatologies since the cinema 
constitutes ‘a normalisation of the social imaginary that is irreducible to familialist and Oedipal 
models’ (155). The shift from the reductive Freudian readings of semantics to the Lacanian 
strucutralist readings in terms of the signifier are, for Guattari, no great advance in 
psychoanalytic  attempts to diagnose the cinema. Disputing especially Metz’s approach to the 
cinema as being structured in a similar manner to the Lacanian unconscious ‘like a lanugage’ 
through an assembly of syntagmatic chains, Guattari argues that cinema’s ‘montage of a-
signifying semiotic chains of intensities, movements and multiplicities fundamentally tends to 
free it from the signifying grid’ (161). This is not to say that Guattari has a utopian view of 
cinema, which he in fact says is just as repressive as psychoanalysis, only in a completely 
different manner. What cinema, at least in its commercial forms offers is a machinic, 
‘inexpensive drug’ (162), that in its own way works on the unconscious. Instead of paying for a 
professional witness as in psychoanalysis, at the cinema, the audience pays less money to be 
‘invaded by subjective arrangements with blurry contours ... that, in principle, have no lasting 
effects’ (163). In practice what is enacted does have effects in that it models forms of subjective 
mutation, which remain as traces of the cinematic session, just as do other narcotics. As a 
machinic narcotic, cinema is a giant and much more effective process for the production of 
normalisation than the psychoanalytic cure but paradoxically it does this via a process of 
complete subjective deterritorialisation. For this reason, cinema is both ‘the best and the worst’ 
that modern capitalist societies offer their subjects and contains within its machinic production of 
subjectivity liberating potentials: ‘a film that could shake free of its function of adaptational 
drugging could have unimaginable liberating effects on an entirely different scale to those 
produced by books’ (164). This is because cinematic language is a living language that while for 
the most part turned towards repressive ends is uniquely able to capture and express processes of 
psychic semiotisation and therefore could become ‘a cinema of combat, attacking dominant 
values in the present state of things’ (165).  
Elsewhere, Guattari develops his own conception of  minor cinema, related to but distinct 
from Deleuze’s elaboration of this field. As Gary Genosko has pointed out (2009, 134ff.) with 
both authors this is both related to and distinct from theoretical and practical elaborations of third 
cinema and in Guattari’s case certainly takes a distance from doctrinaire positions and narrow 
definitions of  worthwhile modes of cinematic production. Guattari’s examples range from 
obscure anti-psychiatric documentaries, to the works of nascent American auteurs like David 
Lynch and Terence Malick, an eclecticism that also informs Berardi’s use of cinema. What 
Guattari’s cinematic examples share is that in his reading of them, they all elaborate non-
normative processes of desire, capable in principle of countering the normalisation processes of 
both commercial cinema and psychoanalysis. For example, Guattari indicates several examples 
that could constitute a cinema of anti-psychiatry or sees in a film like Malick’s Badlands (1973), 
a profound process of ‘amour fou’ or schizo-desire worthy of the best productions of the 
surrealists (Guattari 1996, 167-176). But perhaps the most interesting reading of cinema as a 
symptomatology that Guattari presents is in relation to the compendium film, Germany in 
Autumn (1978); since Berardi also engages with this film it is worth looking at Guattari’s reading 
of the film in more detail before passing onto Berardi’s telegraphic account of the film. 
Guattari’s piece on the film is entitled ‘Like the Echo of a Collective Melancholia’ (181-
187). This title already indicates that this is not at all a question of even multiple authorship but 
of a collectively produced work that furthermore expresses wider collective affects and subjective 
responses to the events surrounding the Baader Meinhof/Red Army Fraction’s actions, the 
‘murder-suicides’ of its leaders in prison and the corresponding intensification of state repression 
and policing. Guattari points out that the collective dimensions of the film go beyond being the 
work of multiple directors but was the result of common elaborations and was made in the heat of 
the moment under the impact of the ‘terrorist events’ themselves.1
 
 What Guattari especially 
admires in the film is the attempt on the part of its makers to resist the media intoxication 
surrounding the events, that the ‘terrorists’ themselves also contributed to as well as what he calls 
the media's ‘infernal machine of guilt-inducement’ (182). For Guattari, Rather than dealing with 
the sphere of ideology in which positions and opinions have already become hardened, the film 
‘questions the collective emotional context in which these opinions take shape’ (183). In relation 
to the abhorrent media spectacles engineered by the RAF from the inane replication of bourgeois 
justice to staging skyjackings as a media event to the (mis)treatment of fellow travellers, the film 
Germany in Autumn gives a sympomatological response, critical of all sides of this situation (the 
RAF, the state, the media) even if for Guattari, the film is still too timid in its critique of the 
actions of these self-appointed vanguard movements. This kind of symptomatology is presented 
by Guattari as a powerful weapon and an essential one if any really profound political change is 
going to occur, since it is a singular expression of desire that acts directly on subjective 
mutations, rather than relegating subjectivity to a mere epi-phenomenon of conflicting 
ideological positions. 
 
Berardi and the Cinema of 77: Cinematic Late Modernism, Germany in Autumn and The 
Serpent's Egg 
In Precarious Rhapsody, Berardi also deals with this film if only very briefly, along with a range 
of other events taking place in 1977, including the explosion and repression of the Autonomia 
movement in Rome and Bologna, the punk phenomenon, the beginnings of Apple, the already 
mentioned terrorist events and even such events as the death of Charlie Chaplin which takes on 
the implication of the death of modernity itself. For Berardi, the film ‘tells of the widespread 
perception of the coming end of social solidarity’ (2009a, 16). He sees in the film a type of fog 
descending on political life, and a situation in which Stammheim becomes a metaphor the 
‘everyday jail’ that is spreading throughout social life (16). Apart form its extreme brevity, this 
reading of Germany in Autumn contrasts with Guattari’s approach to the film in many respects: in 
the place of a courageous project in common that diagnoses and resists a contemporary condition, 
in other words a symptomatology, we have the film being treated as a symptom, a metaphor of 
the hardening of political life begun in 1977 and continued subsequently with the dual 
implementation of Neoliberal economic policies and digital technologies. Berardi’s reading 
seems a Foucauldian one of seeing in the film an emblem of carceral society at the very point in 
which from of power and control were transforming themselves, while forms of resistance were 
                                                 
1 For a more detailed treatment of this film and Guattari’s treatment of it in relaiton to Fassbinder’s relation to 
‘terrorism’, see Michael Goddard and Benjamin Halligan (2010), ‘The Autumn in Germany: A Dialogue on 
Fassbinder and Terrorism’, in Fabio Vighi and Alexis Nouss ed. Pasolini, Fassbinder and Europe: Between 
Utopia and Nihilism. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press,  151-170.   
becoming exhausted. No doubt the differences between hindsight and a contemporary response 
are part of the explanation and surely Guattari’s view of the film, after the ‘years of winter’ of the 
1980s would also have been reconfigured. Nevertheless, in the treatment of this film, telegraphic 
though it is, it is hard to see anything other than a quite conventional treatment of it as a symptom 
of its time rather than a symptomatology capable of explaining it. 
It is a little unfair to concentrate on this example, however, since there are other instances 
in which Berardi’s approach to cinematic cartographies does indeed attain the level of 
symptomatology. There is a definite continuity here with Deleuze and Guattari’s interests in 
minor cinema, in Berardi’s work often associated both with minor works by major directors, as 
well as with films produced in non-Western, mostly Asian, locations. Berardi’s examples, unlike 
Guattari’s, tend not to be forms of militant, documentary or anti-psychiatric cinema, which is 
partly explicable because of the disappearance and marginalisation of these cinematic practices. 
However, what Berardi is interested in are films that map subjective mutations in relation to 
digital technologies, post-fordist transformations of labour and the implantation of cognitive 
capitalism, which tend to be located in more mainstream films, even if these cartographies do not 
engage with Hollywood blockbusters. 
In the third chapter of The Soul at Work, ‘The Poisoned Soul’ (Berardi 2009b, 106-183), 
cinema is first introduced as a corollary to Berardi’s treatment of alienation as a now surpassed or 
reconfigured problem of modernity. Two films, which could be seen as exemplary of late 
cinematic modernism, namely Antonioni’s Red Desert (1964) and Bergman’s Persona (1966), 
are used as diagnoses of subjectivity in the last years of the industrial era. Nevertheless the 
treatment of these films is as more than mere symptoms but as complex readings of the times of 
the 60s in which they were produced. In Red Desert what Berardi admires is that the film not 
only depicted the malaise associated with industrial spaces and alienated social relations but that 
it succeeded in ‘representing a passage that is not simply related to culture and politics but first of 
all to the sensibility and quality of emotions’ (110). This is not unlike Deleuze’s characterisation 
of Antonioni as the filmmaker of the ‘chronic’ in the double sense of both a transformation in the 
experience of time and a chronic experience of spiritual malaise. Berardi situates this rightly in 
the bourgeois milieu prior to 1968 in which the diagnosis of the coldness of private relations was 
one of the factors leading to the public explosion of 1968. What Antonioni shows, through his 
use of flattened pop art ‘flat interiors and desolate industrial exteriors’ (110) is an 
industrialisation not only of exterior spaces but also of subjective existence, which undergoes a 
similar flattening and homogenisation.  
In a different yet related way, Berardi sees in Bergman’s Persona a similar study of 
contemporary alienation that goes beyond any individual psychopathology to a deep cultural 
malaise. Again it is a presentation of cultural incommunicability and reification in which the 
person is submitted to the thing (111). In this respect it is surprising that no mention is made of 
the machinic elements in Persona such as the child’s hand on the giant screen at the beginning of 
the film or the burning through of the film-strip later in the film which are highly suggestive of a 
reflexive interpenetration of cinema, technology and subjectivity. Nor does Berardi refer to the 
scenes watched on television related to the Vietnam war, specifically of the Buddhist monks’ 
political acts of self-immolation, which not only situate the subjective drama in relation to 
political movements to come but also serve to extend its presentation of silence and aphasia 
beyond a strictly personal and into a world-historical context. Much of this is, however, implied 
when Berardi treats the rarefying of human communication in the film as a ‘cipher of the human 
ambience that was brewing in those years’ (110). While both these films are acknowledged as 
symptomatologies of their time, their treatment remains unsatisfyingly condensed and still on the 
borders of a being a mere illustration of a cultural condition of reification and subjective malaise 
rather than a full symptomatology of these conditions, even if they are presented as sowing the 
seeds for the new forms of post 1968 social relations that would render their depictions of 
(bourgeois) alienation almost obsolescent. 
There is a far more interesting treatment, however, of another Bergman film, The Serpent’s 
Egg (1977), again in the context of the year 1977 as a crucial axis of transition between fordism 
and post-fordism. As Berardi acknowledges, this film is generally considered a minor one in 
Bergman’s career and even Bergman himself refers to it as an artistic failure: ‘I wrote that the 
artistic failure of The Serprent’s Egg was due mainly to the fact that I set the film in 1920s Berlin 
… now I believe the failure lies much deeper’ (Bergman 1994, 190). Interestingly, given 
Berardi’s theses on the digital era as being characterized precisely by the excess of stimuli, 
messages, pharmaceutical intake and demands for constant attention to multiple data flows, 
Bergman further qualifies the failure of the film not as lacking something but in terms of a similar 
perceptual excess, ‘It is overstimulated, as if it had taken anabolic steroids’ (190). For Bergman 
there was ‘too much’ in the film meaning that the story he wanted to tell about two trapeze artists 
who are stranded because the death of the third member of their act has died was contaminated by 
taking place in the actual historical city of Berlin on the eve of the Nazi seizure of power. 
Nevertheless it is this contamination between these interpersonal relations and their decay and the 
historically situated decay of Berlin in the 1920s that makes this minor Bergman film so 
interesting and connects up its affective dynamics with world historical forces. In Precarious 
Rhapsody, Berardi states that viewing The Serpent’s Egg at the end of 1977 it seemed to speak 
directly to his generation’s political experiences and provided ‘a very interesting insight in[to] the 
construction of the totalitarian mind’ (2009a, 15). The film’s reference in the title to the serpent’s 
egg of Nazism ‘slowly opening’ (16) seemed highly relevant in in a context in which the 
repression of Radio Alice and the Autonomia movement was similarly accompanied by ‘the 
smell of a new totalitarianism in the making’ (16). In other words, rather than seeing the film as 
an accurate or otherwise portrayal of the proto-Nazi era in Germany in the 1920s, the film 
functioned for Berardi as an accurate symptomatology of the present, precisely because it traced 
the emergence of totalitarianism on a virtual, affective plane, at once abstract and concrete, that 
was not limited to a specific historical representation. This perhaps echoes what Bergman had 
originally hoped from the film and yet paradoxically it only works this way because it is 
grounded in an actual historical period from which it is able to extract the signs of a more general 
process, relevant also to the present, that is it functions precisely as a symptomatology. 
In The Soul at Work, this approach to the film is expanded and Berardi goes as far as to 
claim that the film ‘opens the way to a new definition of historicity ... redefining alienation as a 
material, chemical, or rather neuro-chemical mutation’ (112). In other words, something happens 
to Bergman’s earlier diagnoses of alienation and incommunicability in films like Persona which 
is more than the mere fact of placing the affective relations in a specific historical context. The 
Serpent’s Egg operates on a chemical or molecular level prior to the actual emergence of fixed 
ideologies or even emotions, instead tracking their processes of constitution as a type of chemical 
pollution of the collective mind. What is crucial about the film is that precisely because it 
operates at this molecular level, the processes it discerns are applicable to other types of mental 
pollution such as by consumerism, competitive conformism or religious fundamentalisms. It is 
perhaps surprising that Berardi makes no reference to Wilhelm Reich’s The Mass Psychology of 
Fascism which not only attempted a similar analysis of the mental processes that enabled the 
emergence of Fascism but was also a key reference point for Deleuze and Guattari’s concept in 
Anti-Oedipus of the co-extensiveness of desire with the social field, albeit one with some 
shortcomings (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 31). If Berardi prefers Bergman’s ‘artistic 
cartography’ of this phenomenon to Reich’s psychoanalytic one it is perhaps precisely due to the 
retreat on Reich’s part from the full implications of this co-extensiveness of the fields of desire 
and the social which in some respects the film presents in a better way as a poisoning of affective 
relations at a molecular level rather than as a mass ideological process. Berardi refers to a crowd 
scene in the film in which ‘the social body is transformed by Nazism into and amorphous mass ... 
ready to be led’ (112). But this is shown in the film via slow motion and expressive deformations 
of colour, less as the actions of a persuasive ideology than as a growing environmental toxicity 
that leads the social over a pathological threshold in the manner of a chemical reaction.  
The title of the film refers to a speech by Brutus in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar in which 
the latter is likened to a serpent’s egg in order to justify his killing not for the evil that he had 
already committed but for what he would do, given absolute power in other words as type of pre-
emption. On a simplistic level then the film might imply the situation in which Hitler and Nazism 
could have been resisted before the seizure of power made any such resistance much more 
difficult if not impossible. But the film does not focus on this level at all but rather on the 
symptomatology of this virtual process of the poisoning of social relations prior to their political 
or ideological results. As such it treats incommunicability and alienation not as a metaphor but as 
a psychopathological process ‘spreading on a social scale’ (113). This is what renders the film’s 
presentation of alienation as at once psychic and social, material and affective with a direct 
relationship between these spheres. This is precisely the operation of a symptomatology since 
symptoms experienced by individual characters are not presented as disconnected individual 
symptoms but as signs of an emergent social psychopathology that a more historicist or even 
psychoanalytic analysis would mask through processes of representation and metaphor. Again 
Berardi insists that this film was not primarily about the past but the present or rather the future 
that was emerging at its time of production in 1977 and that is now our present, the complete 
inter-penetration of subjective life by market forces, info-productive stimulation and the 
languages of advertising and consumerism that operate on us ‘like a nerve gas’ (113). Berardi is 
not equating contemporary Neoliberalism with Nazism but rather insisting that the subjective 
mutations it has unleashed are even further reaching and more profound, since it operates directly 
on the virtual level of modulating affect and sensibility or what Berardi calls ‘the biological and 
cognitive texture of society’ rather than on ‘superficial behaviours’ (113). This is already quite a 
lot to find in a film considered even by its director as a failure but it is this very failure that 
perhaps allows the film to operate on a minor register that is able to directly link up affective and 
historical processes, the material and the immaterial, in a similar manner to Kafka’s work to 
whom the concept of the minor was first applied by Deleuze and Guattari. 
In a similar vein, Berardi turns later on in the same chapter to a ‘minor’ work by Wenders, 
Tokyo-Ga (1985), in which he sees as indicating a possible artistic or even therapeutic approach 
to the contemproary situation of enchained desire, the emergence of which was so well diagnosed 
in The Serpent’s Egg. Like Bergman’s film, Tokyo-Ga is usually considered as a minor one but 
Berardi situates it as a key point of transition between the ‘dreamy, slow and nostalgic narration’ 
(143) of Wenders 70s cinema and his later ‘conflicted but fascinated use of electronic 
technologies’ (143), especially in Until the End of the World (1991). The real precursor, however, 
to Tokyo-Ga is Lightning over Water (Nick’s Film) (1980) a film in which Wenders acted out his 
attachment to the work of the dying director Nicholas Ray by making a documentary on him 
whose production is shown to be possibly detrimental to Ray’s health or even precipitating his 
death. In Tokyo-Ga, these dynamics are reversed since it is not merely a matter of calling up the 
dead but also the disappearance of an entire world of which nothing remains except Ozu’s films 
and some of his collaborators. 
The search for Ozu then becomes the chronicle of a disappearance that at the same time 
presents contemporary hyper-modern Japan in the old-fashioned form of a journal of impressions, 
thoughts and emotions. For Berardi, Ozu’s cinema not only belongs to the now vanished society 
of pre-war Japan but also involved a human use of technology whereby it was able to extend 
traditional modes of perception and experience while at the same time respecting them, hence the 
stationary shots of traditional environments that seem to relegate modernity to an unobtrusive 
backdrop. Wenders’ camera, however, reveals a totally transformed world in which these human 
technology relations have been reversed so much so that human sensory perception becomes the 
effect of a global panoptic gaze in world of generalised simulation, in line with contemporary 
theories of the time such as Baudrillard’s. For Berardi, the Japan presented by Wenders is one in 
which an ‘artificial mutation has occurred: the world is nothing but a simulation effect’ (144). 
Included in Wenders’ inventory are simulated objects like the artificial food that is created to 
advertise the wares of restaurants, to simulated social activities such as rooftop golf driving 
ranges in which the imperial open-air sport is transformed into a solipsistic leisure activity for 
salarymen for whom both space and free time are limited. Even more than this Pachinko is 
singled out as a reified activity, at once individual, isolating and collective which, as Barthes had 
already pointed out, resembles nothing so much as working on a production line. While all of 
these accounts run the risk of a residual Orientalism, what justifies it in Wenders’ film is a shared 
experience between Germany and Japan of a traumatic, unassimilable war-time past, from which 
some kind of escape route needs to be found; in West Germany via rock music and American 
movies in Japan via pachinko (even if American popular culture played a decisive role in both 
contexts).  
For Berardi, Wenders film presents hyper-modern Japan under the sign of the void which is  
‘not the void that Zen Buddhism talks about, or not only that’ (146). Rather using film history as 
a cartographic tool, Wenders is able to point to the emergence of a new kind of void, not at all 
like the emptiness and space for meditaiton in Ozu’s films provided by the famous ‘pillow shots’ 
or still lifes that Deleuze discusses in Cinema 2. This new type of void, acocording to Berardi, 
belongs no longer to the world of Ozu but to ‘the Demiurge of simulation’ (146). In other words 
what Wenders discerns in contemporary Japan is precisely the world of simulation and 
derealisation as described by Buadrillard and this is precisely what Berardi goes on to discuss. At 
this point, however, a question could be raised as to whether Wenders’ film was the most useful 
cinematic cartography to use either for its presentation of contemporary Japan or the derealised 
world of simulation in general. Chris Marker’s Sunless (1982), for example, is a much more 
nuanced engagement with the same context and one that is far less tainted by European romantic 
orientalism or such a Manichean view of the mutations brought about by simulation technologies. 
In Marker’s film, for example, there is the idea of multiple co-existing temporalities as a way of 
understanding cultural differences as expressive of different rhythms that may render seemingly 
bizarre or inexplicable observations if not understandable then at least referable to a different 
temporality which one must approach with sensitivity before simply interpreting in a western 
framework. While Wenders acts as if he somehow knows Japan via the films of Ozu, Marker 
foregrounds his position as an outsider, a traveler, who can only assemble and reflect on images, 
rather than gain direct access to an ontological truth. From this perspective the technologisation 
and implantation of simulation technologies, which Marker tracks through fairly similar 
phenomena to Wenders but is more prepared to follow their different rhythms rather than 
constantly comparing them to the ideal presented by Ozu’s cinema, an ideal which after all has 
never existed as such even in pre-war Japan. This becomes apparent in Marker’s fascination with 
the inventions of new modes of video imagery which are being developed in Japan, a far more 
fruitful area of engagement than simulated food or golf, since it refers to the imminent 
transformation of visual regimes that Wenders would later investigate in Until the End of the 
World. There is a kind of self-indulgent perversity in Tokyo-Ga in Wenders’ drive to find traces 
of the world of Ozu in Tokyo, as if such a world ever existed except in a Western cinephile 
fantasy of Japan that is entirely lacking in Marker’s film which instead sees in Japan a new 
constellaiton of both innovation and tradition, old and new forms of temporality, which he locates 
on a global plan that also takes in Africa and Europe, as well as Japan. The post-human 
dimension diagnosed in Wenders film is at the very least a problematic one, at least partially 
generated by cinephile projections of an idealised nostalgic past and the assimilation of Japanese 
post-war experience to that of an exoticised Germany. This is brought out especially in the 
conversation between Wenders and Herzog in which the latter maintains that it is not only 
impossible to make films in Europe or America but virtually anywhere on the globe since 
everywhere has been ruined by the civilisation of the image. For these reasons, while Berardi is 
able to bring out what the film does, despite its limitations, show of the mutation of subjective 
experience under post-industrial conditions, neither Wenders’ film, nor Berardi’s treatment of it 
provides as rich a symptomatology as his treatment of The Serpent’s Egg. 
 
 
Contemporary Cinema as Symptomatology: Elephant and Still Life 
Berardi’s engagement with cinematic cartographies are not, however confined to the works of 
European auteurs or to what is now part of film history but instead have engaged with several 
contemporary exmaples of both film and video art. Amongst these examples, Gus van Sant’s 
Elephant is one that is treated as a contemporary symptomatology of Neoliberal societies under 
the implementation of digital technologies in the affective realm but he also significantly refers to 
several films of an Asian provenance as similarly tracking contemporary affective and cognitive 
mutations, particularly Zhang Ke Jia’s Still Life and Kim Ki-Duk’s Time (2006). These 
contemporary cinematic examples are accompanied by engagements with video art, advertising, 
digital pornography and even the uses of the media on the part of homicidal/suicidal killers, 
sometimes but not always on a similar symptomatic rather than symptomatological plane. 
Elephant is discussed in the ‘Frail Psychosphere’ chapter of Precarious Rhapsody as 
providing a much better account than Michael Moore’s Bowling for Columbine (2002) of the 
psychopathological conditions capable of generating Columbine style murder-suicide events, 
among what Berardi refers to as the digital-connective generation. While the discussion of the 
film is brief it is very significant since the chapter will go on to elaborate the mutations or even 
destruction of sensitivity and and sensibility that for Berardi characterise the digital era, as 
expressed in the symptomatic forms of digital pornography, ‘torture porn’ and killer videos. Like 
The Serprent’s Egg, Elephant probes beneath the surface of contemporary destructiveness, 
avoiding readymade answers to the questions of the mental conditions facilitating the eruption of 
mass murder in an ordinary high school. In Elephant, the banal events of an ‘ordinary’ day are 
followed until it is revealed that this day is not so ordinary and that two of the teenagers shown 
are about to kill as many as possible of their classmates and teachers. However the brutality is not 
limited to these acts but pervades all the relations shown in the film through a generalised 
atmosphere of disconnection and malaise that effectively updates the one shown in Bergman’s 
films. Berardi gives the example of the ‘relational incompetence’ shown in the dialogue of three 
female friends intent in quantifying the amount of time required to spend with a ‘best friend’ 
when one has a boyfriend thereby enacting a total reduction of social relations to a banal 
algorithm. Admittedly there would be some counter examples such as the creativity represented 
via the interest in several of the teenagers in photography but this is presented as a weak 
resistance to the general atmosphere of disconnection. More poignantly the seemingly endless 
corridors of the high school are shows as a non-space in which relations are reduced to the 
judgments of ‘looks’ in the sense of both appearances and a vacant gaze in which those of the 
prospective killers are not so different from those of their classmates. For Berardi this is a 
symptom of a transition from what he calls conjunction to connection in which direct, imperfect 
and unmediated contact has been replaced by virtual connections at a distance so that the 
difference between playing a violent video game and playing it out in real life with one’s 
neighbouring human beings is only a difference in degree not in kind. This decline in the contact 
with the other results in what Berardi calls ‘a peripheral massacre-reproducible, replicable, 
contagious’ (86) not so much a tragedy or exceptional event as an index of a world in which 
images of sexuality and brutality circulate as an everyday banality with little distinction between 
them. What Berardi admires in Elephant which is lacking in Bowling for Columbine is the 
symptomatology of the cognitive mutation gripping the video-electronic generation in which the 
functionality of connection leads to an atrophy of affect and sensitivity to the other which are the 
pre-conditions for such an everyday massacre to occur. 
Berardi’s discussion of Still Life takes place in a different context, that of 21st Century 
dystopian art in which the late 20th Century literary dystopias of Burroughs or Phillip K.Dick 
have now occupied the entire space of artistic imagination in film, video art and literature but 
now without any sense of an outside or any alternative future. In this dystopian context, Still Life 
stands out as a unique depiction of the effects of Chinese capitalism, in its presentation of the 
main character Huo, who is searching for his family amid the architectural and social wreckage 
caused by the three gorges dam project. Not only has his riverside village been destroyed but so 
has  the entire social fabric so that the only available form of employment is to participate in 
completing the destruction of the villages initiated by the building of the dam. The film therefore 
provides a portrait of ‘submerged life’ that is at once surreal and the most realistic portrayals of 
the operations of contemporary Chinese capitalism, through the destroyed environment unleashed 
by the dam, itself a microcosm of the violence of neoliberal capitalist transformation. If the 
dystopian aesthetics of Zhang Ke’s film as well as Jonathan Franzen’s novel, The Corrections, 
are still treated as symptomatologies they are nevertheless seen as powerless ones and this is even 
more the case with Berardi’s treatment of video art. While the work of Eija-Liisa Ahtila is 
reduced to the psychopathology of relations, the inability to touch and to be touched’ (132), 
Yakizakana no Uta/ The Song of the Mackerel (2004) in which a fish about to be eaten keeps 
happily chatting to the student who will eat it all the way from the supermarket shelf to the plate, 
is presented as a pure symptom of the powerlessness of contemporary art to be anything except  
confirm the contemporary dystopian condition by navigating a path between cynicism and irony 
‘that allows them to suspend the execution at least for the moment’ (135) but necessarily devoid 
of any desire for rupture or resistance.  
 
Conclusion: The Social Network as 21st Century Symptomatology 
This bleak account of contemporary artistic production and especially of video art is the direct 
result of a Manichean approach to the subjective mutations unleashed by digital processes that 
proceeds by abandoning the symptomatological approach that had been accorded to earlier 
cinematic works, instead seeing the works of video art as mere symptoms of the their dystopian 
times. This can be seen in the strong distinctions Berardi makes between conjunction and 
connection and between the modern, cinematic  order of expression and reproduction and the 
contemporary order of simulacra and synthetic images. This is a recapitulation of Baudrillard’s 
(anti) postmodern stance that may be similarly blind to the more nuanced aspects of 
contemporary subjective mutations in the digital-connective era. Relegating artistic cartographies 
to a position of powerlessness may reflect a relative decline in the belief in their effectiveness or 
subversive powers, relative to the Twentieth Century avant-gardes but it is too drastic to see in 
contemporary artistic, cinematic and media art practices nothing more than futile gestures of 
temporary survival. While Berardi’s readings of some of the cinematic examples mentioned are 
at times nuanced and fascinating, the readings of video art as presented in Precarious Rhapsody 
are violently reductive, missing the subtleties of Athila’s work on mediated subjectivities and 
providing a too metaphorical reading of Song of the Mackerel that at the same time underplays its 
humorous and ecologically post-human dimensions. 
A final cinematic counter-example can be given that calls for a fully symptomatological 
reading, namely David Fincher’s recent film, The Social Network (2010). Just as his earlier film 
Fight Club (1999) gave a depiction of the Millennial affective unease that seemed to prefigure 
events as diverse as the alter-globalaisation movement and the 9/11 attacks, The Social Network 
provides a visualisation of a ‘history of the present’ that is so far yet to be represented. The fact 
that the film is largely based on the sensational novelisation of an at best partial account of the 
events leading to the formation of Facebook is of no consequence since the film is less concerned 
with this history as such, as much as what it is able to reveal about contemporary social 
exsistence and the implementation of its mediation via technical networks. In the opening scenes, 
Mark Zuckerberg is presented as at once highly relationally dysfunctional and hyper-functional 
cognitively as he seems to be simultaneously processing four or five distinct data streams in what 
should be a straightforward conversation. Clearly this embodies the dynamics of Facebook and 
other forms of technical social networking in which the modulation of multiple data streams 
comes to replace focused attention on a specific interlocutor. Mark, continues throughout the film 
to experience problems of attention although often this is less a problem for him than for those 
seeking his attention, as when, for example he is far more concerned with a note condemning him 
for his FaceSmash Website than a computing problem that he nevertheless casually solves as 
exiting the class-room, or tells a lawyer at one of the litigation hearings exactly how miniscule an 
amount of attention he is affording his questions. 
The relations in the film are grounded in the elite context of Harvard and shown as a clash 
between the old moneyed elite and the predominantly Jewish or otherwise ethnically other geeky 
programmers who seem universally to aspire to the social status of the former. However, whereas  
Mark’s best friend Eduardo aims to infiltrate this closed world via perfected competitive 
conformity, Mark thinks that his powers of invention will provide a shorter route via notoreity: a 
conflict in subjective adaptation that structures the entire film with Sean Parker, played by Justin 
Timberlake at the extreme of the unconventional pole and the Winklevoss twins at the extreme 
end of a competitive conformity whose extremity shocks even their peers. This is far from 
constituting anything like class conflict given that at issue on level is merely a question of who 
gets access to being part of an economic and cultural elite, as seen through the desires of already 
privileged college students. However, this internecine conflict at the heart of the constitution of 
contemporary social networks is precisely captivating because its effects so far outstrip their 
causes. What the film shows is how from entirely banal motivations a process of invention is 
unleashed, beyond the wills and intentions of any of its contributors that ends up capturing the 
entire field of social relations. That this is done as blankly as possible is both a reflection of 
Mark’s asociality and a kind of genius for abstraction that was no doubt the key to Facebook’s 
success, humorously dramatised in the film when Sean gives the advice to drop the ‘the’ of 
Facebook so it will be ‘cleaner.’ The result is a film that resembles in many respects Welles’ 
Citizen Kane (1941), in its demonstration of the ruthless development of a media empire which 
ends up betraying any initial idealism it might have had to become a pure expression of capitalist 
forces. Except between the 20th and 21st Centuries media have become both globalised and 
minituarised, so that in the place of the gigantic figure of Kane, shot from below in the manner of 
a great dictator, there is only a small geeky innovator whose social incommunicability is only 
transcended for the occasional brutal put down and for whom non technically mediated 
communication is presented as a painful experience.  
While this account of the film might seem to confirm Berardi’s dystopian view of the 
powerlessness of contemporary artistic cartographies, the sheer joy and energy of the film acts 
against this; it is as if despite everything shown in the film as well as the later aspects of 
Facebook such as its intensive use for data mining and the very commercialisation which it was 
supposed in the beginning to escape, what the film is really about is the power of invention itself 
and more specifically the socialisation of contemporary digital technologies. It implies both a 
critique of all sides of the conflicts over the ownership of the site and their respective subjective 
modalities and hints that the actual use of Facebook and similar tools might and should go 
beyond the limitations of its creators. At the very least it provides a convincing genealogy of one 
aspect of contemporary communicative capitalism, a symptomatology of the present that might 
open up new possibilities for subjective, cognitive mutation beyond a purely capitalist, 
competitive framework. Needless to say, there are numerous other recent films that could be just 
as amenable to such a symptomatological reading including Lars von Trier’s The Boss of it All 
(2006) and Ulrich Seidl’s Import-Export (2007) both of which function as powerful 
symptomatologies of new modes of labour and the production of subjectivity in the respective 
contexts of a small ‘non-herarchical’ IT firm and the still existing economic boundaries between 
Eastern and Western Europe. 
This article has explored the idea of cinematic cartography as a form of symptomatology 
and shown its operations in Berardi’s recent work. As such it deals with an admittedly minor 
aspect of Berardi’s work, but an aspect that is very much tied up with the concept itself of the 
minor, in the sense of cinema constituting a minor art as Deleuze, Guattari and Berardi have all, 
in different ways, proposed. This minor perspective on Berardi’s work is an illuminating one, 
both in terms of its strengths and weaknesses, the former evident in his brilliant reading of 
Bergman’s The Serpent’s Egg, and the latter most apparent in his cursory engagement with works 
of video art as pure symptoms of aesthetic and affective atrophy on par with ‘killer’ videos and 
digital pornography. One can only hope that we will see more use of cinematic and other forms 
of media art cartographies in the full symptomatological sense both in Berardi’s future work and 
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